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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PROTECTION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES:
HOW THE FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION LIST SATISFIES
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aaron L. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the attacks perpetrated against the United
States by a foreign terrorist organization on September 11, 2001,
President Bush avowed that “[t]errorist attacks can shake the
foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the
foundation of America.”1
President Bush’s declaration highlights the twin role of
government in safeguarding the nation and upholding its
foundational liberties. Unfortunately, these goals are sometimes at
odds. Vital U.S. anti-terrorism laws have been criticized for unduly
infringing upon fundamental constitutional rights. This Comment
will explore one of these controversial laws—the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations List—and assess whether Congress effectively
balanced its duty to protect the nation’s security and liberty in
authorizing such legislation.
The Foreign Terrorist Organization List was created by
Congress in response to the 1993 terrorist attack at the World Trade
Center and the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, 2014
1 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to
the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001).
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City.2 Buried within Section 1189 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),3 Congress authorized the
Secretary of State to designate international groups that threatened
the U.S., its citizens, and its interests, as “Foreign Terrorist
Organizations” (FTOs).4 The purpose of Section 1189 is to
stigmatize5 and punish6 rogue organizations, and “prevent persons
within the [U.S.] . . . from providing material support or resources.”7
In this way, Section 1189 offers the U.S. government an
effective legal tool to impede terrorist organizations that threaten
U.S. national security interests.8 Critics argue, however, that the
legislation is unconstitutional because Section 1189 does not compel
the Secretary of State to provide listed organizations adequate notice
or a hearing as required by the Fifth Amendment.9 This comment
Threat of Terrorism: Hearing on Terrorism Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 1995 WL 247423, (1995) (noting the statement of Sen. Specter,
Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, who stated “I am committed, as I believe is
every Senator on this Committee and in this body, to taking any and every step
necessary to assure that there is never another devastation like Oklahoma City”).
3 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) [hereinafter “AEDPA”]
4 Id. (finding that international terrorism is a serious and deadly problem
that threatens the vital interests of the U.S.).
5 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE
“FTO LIST” AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2003) [hereinafter “CRS REPORT”].
6 H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, pt. 2, at 38 (1995) (stating that “the
fundamental purpose of this legislation, then, is to provide our law enforcement
agencies – within carefully prescribed constitutional boundaries – with the tools
necessary to prevent and punish criminal terrorist enterprises”).
7 AEDPA § 301(b).
8 BARACK OBAMA, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, (June 28, 2011) (finding that these organizations make it
their purpose to undermine the security and stability of the U.S.),
http://1.usa.gov/19TulpH. See also RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33600, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, THREAT, POLICY, AND RESPONSE 3-4
(2007) [hereinafter “CRS REPORT 2”] (explaining that “policy and counterterrorism
analysts are concerned that economic and political tensions throughout the Middle
East might allow FTOs to gain power, legitimacy, and political clout, and if that
comes to pass, the risks to American interests and security would be heightened
substantially”).
9 Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH.
2
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seeks to quell this criticism by demonstrating that the FTO
designation procedures satisfy contemporary due process standards.
Part I reviews the procedural background and history of
Section 1189. Part II describes the “what” and “when” requirements
of procedural due process. Part III discusses a series of cases
challenging FTO designation on procedural due process grounds.
Finally, Part IV covers due process in light of those decisions, and
concludes that Section 1189 complies with Fifth Amendment
standards.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE FTO LIST
A. The Purpose of the FTO Compared to Other U.S.-GovernmentMaintained Terrorist Lists
The FTO List is one of several terrorism lists maintained by
the U.S. Government. While there is an overlap between lists, each
possesses a unique scope and purpose within the context of U.S.
national security.
The FTO List is limited to foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activities that “threaten American security.”10 Section 1189
authorizes the Secretary of State to identify and designate the
organizations in consultation with the Attorney General and
Secretary of Homeland Security.11 Consequences of designation are
social, financial, and legal.12

L. REV. 125, 167 (2004) [hereinafter “A Double Due Process Denial”); see also Eric
Broxmeyer, The Problem of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 439, 441 (2004).
10 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004).
11 Id.
12 See infra Part 2.C (describing these consequences in detail).
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The State Department also maintains the State Sponsors of
Terrorism (SST) List.13 SST only applies to states that support acts of
international terrorism.14
A third list maintained by the State Department is the
Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).15 TEL impacts individuals and applies
strictly for immigration purposes, and authorizes the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Attorney General, to deny known members
of terrorist organizations entry to the U.S.16
The fourth list, the Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT)
List, originally targeted individuals or entities that threatened to
disrupt the Middle East peace process.17 Subsequent legislation,
however, expanded the SDT List to allow the President to regulate
international economic transactions during times of war or national
emergencies.18 Following the events of September 11, 2001, President
Bush exercised his presidential authority to create the Specifically
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) List.19 Together SDT and
SDGT freeze the U.S.-based assets of any person, organization, or
nation the President determines has planned, authorized, aided, or
engaged in hostilities or attacks against the U.S.20 The U.S.
Department of Treasury is in charge of managing SDT and SDGT.21

See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat.
503, § 6(j) (1979) (as amended).
14 As of July 31, 2012, the States listed as “sponsors of terrorism”
included Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE
COORDINATOR OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
2011 (2012), http://1.usa.gov/KnEtOF.
15 Uniting And Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) [hereinafter US PATRIOT Act].
16 Id.
17 See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 C.F.R. 5079 (1995) (citing International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)); 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
18 Id.
19 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 68 C.F.R. 10619 (2003).
20 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2001).
21 Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
NATIONALS LIST (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1ausowX (listing the organizations and
13

295

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

In sum, the Executive branch maintains several avenues to
categorize and sanction terrorist organizations and activities.22
Among all lists, however, the FTO holds unique importance, “not
only because of the specific measures undertaken to thwart the
activities of designated groups but also because of the symbolic
public role it plays as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy.” 23
B. The Process of Designating FTOs
Section 1189 of the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary of State
to designate entities as “foreign terrorist organizations.” 24
Designation requires the Secretary to provide an administrative
record reflecting that (A) the organization is foreign, (B) the
organization engages in terrorist activity,25 and (C) the terrorist
activity directly threatens U.S. national security.26

individuals designated under the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s economic
sanctions regimes, which includes those entities designated as FTOs by the
Secretary of State).
22 See supra Part II.A. For more information on the lists and their
procedural safeguards and judicial oversight visit the State Department’s Bureau of
Counterterrorism, http://1.usa.gov/JOtuMZ.
23 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
24 Although the Secretary of State officially designates a group, a number
of agencies play important roles in helping the Secretary make the determination.
See id. at 2.
25 AEDPA at § 219(a)(1) (defining terrorist activities as: “activity which is
unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves any of the following: (I) The high jacking or
sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle); (II) The
seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another
individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the individual seized or detained; (III) A violent attack
upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title
18) or upon the liberty of such a person; (IV) An assassination; (V) The use of
any— (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b)
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of
one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property; (VI) A threat,
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The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (S/CT)
is tasked with monitoring the activities of suspected terrorist groups
around the world and identifying organizations that qualify for
designation under the Act.27 S/CT deems entities suitable for
designation based on whether the organization (1) has carried out any
terrorist attacks, (2) is planning or preparing to carry out possible
future acts, and/or (3) retains the capability and intent to carry out
such acts.28 The S/CT receives support in this endeavor from the
intelligence community and the Department of Homeland Security.29
The S/CT’s reports and findings form the basis of the
administrative record, which is presented to the Secretary of State for
consideration.30 If approved, the request for designation passes to the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security for
independent evaluation and recommendation.31
Seven days before an organization is officially designated, the
Secretary is required to notify32 specified members of Congress of
“the intent to designate the organization . . . and the factual basis
therefore.”33 Congress may block a designation, but if no action is
taken the designation becomes final when notice is published, or
“listed,” in the Federal Register.34

attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing”). See also 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(2000 & Supp. I 2001) 2013.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004) (stating that activities threaten U.S.
national security interests when the activity impacts the “national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States”).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
31 Id.
32 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that notification occurs through
classified communication).
33 Id. (requiring notification to relevant congressional committees, the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the Majority and
Minority Leader, and the President pro tempore of the Senate).
34 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (requiring constructive, not actual, notice).
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C. Consequences of FTO Designation
The consequences of designation are manifold. First, the
Treasury Department may block or control the funds of the
organization and all known agents.35 Second, the Justice Department
may prosecute third parties that provide material support to the
designated entity.36 Third, known members of the organizations are
deported, denied visas, and summarily excluded from the U.S.37
Finally, designation as an FTO allows the U.S. Government
to exercise a form of soft power.38 By designating an entity as a
“terrorist organization,” the U.S. formally signals to the international
community that the U.S. is concerned with the named organization’s
activities.39 Often, other nations will then react pursuant to their own
law and jurisdiction to similarly curb the organization’s financing and
activities.40 This heightened international cognizance may also cause
private citizens to abstain from donating, contributing, or otherwise
engaging in economic transactions with the named organization.41
Consequently, designation is said to stigmatize and isolate the entity,42
acting as de facto economic sanctions.43
D. Removal from the FTO List
There are several ways an entity may be removed from the
FTO List. First, removal may be granted by an Act of Congress or at
the discretion of the Secretary of State.44

CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
Id. at 3.
37 Id.
38 See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS OF SUCCESS IN
WORLD POLITICS 5-11 (2004) (defining “soft power”).
39 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, FACT SHEET:
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (FTOs), (2010) http://1.usa.gov/KnGZ7r.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-3.
44 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4). Prior to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 designations were effective for two years at which time the
Secretary could choose to re-designate an organization or allow designation to
35
36
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Second, an organization may request judicial review “within
thirty days of publication in the Federal Register of a designation, an
amended designation, or a determination in response to a petition for
revocation.”45 The request must be made to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.46 The scope of
judicial review is limited to unclassified material in the administrative
record, but the government may also “submit, for ex parte and in
camera review, classified information.”47 The court may only overturn
a designation that was (A) “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”; (B)
“contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity”; (C)
in “excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation or short of
statutory right”; (D) “lacking substantial support in the administrative
record as a whole”; or (E) not made “in accord with the procedures
required by law.”48
Third, two years after the initial designation, an organization
may file a petition with the State Department requesting removal.49
The Secretary must review this request and respond within 180
days.50 A successful petition requires the organization to demonstrate
the circumstances of designation51 are “sufficiently different”52—i.e.,
the organization no longer engages in terrorist activities. If the
petition is rejected, the entity must wait two years before re-filing.53 If
lapse. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3801-03 (2004) [hereinafter IRTPA].
45 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1).
46 Id.
47 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(2); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th ed.
2009) (defining ex parte review as a proceeding conducted without both parties to
the suit being present; and defining an in camera review as a proceeding where the
Judge assesses confidential, sensitive, or private information outside the public’s
purview in order to determine what, if any, information may be used by a party to
the suit or made public).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2)-(3).
49 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(i). Notably, this procedure was not in the
original legislation, but was added by the 2004 Amendment. IRTPA, n. 9 §
7119(a)(2).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv).
51 See supra Part II.B.
52 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(iii).
53 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(ii).
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five years pass without review, the State Department must initiate its
own review of the organization’s status and determine whether
continued designation is justified.54
E. History of the FTO List
In October 1997, the State Department released the first
FTO List.55 Thirty entities were designated.56 In October 1999, the
first review occurred.57 Twenty-seven of the original groups were redesignated, three designations lapsed, and one entity was added.58
Two years later, in the wake of 9/11, the total number of designated
organizations grew significantly.59 At the time this comment was
published, fifty-seven groups were listed as FTOs and nine previously
designated organizations have been de-listed.60
II. THE CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS,
AND 8 U.S.C. § 1189
A. The Scope of Constitutional Protection
Prior to appearing before a federal court, a plaintiff must
demonstrate Article III standing.61 Standing “focuses on the party
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C).
CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that the first designations took
place about “eighteen months after the passage of AEDPA”).
56 Id.
57 Because the first review occurred before the 2004 amendment, the
Secretary was statutorily required to review designations every two years. See
IRTPA, at § 7119.
58 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (noting the group added in 1999 was
al-Qaeda because of its involvement in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Darr Es Salaam, Tanzania).
59 See
Bureau
of
Counterterrorism,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/index.htm.
60 Id.
61 State of Mich. v. U.S., 994 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that
“[s]tanding, which comes from Article III’s requirement that federal courts
determine only those issues that arise in a ‘case or controversy,’ is a threshold
requirement to any suit); see also U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 (stating, “The judicial
Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
54
55
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seeking to get his complaint before federal court and not on issues he
wishes to have adjudicated.”62 The elements of standing are: (1) injury
in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of, and (3) that the injury is likely redressed by a
favorable decision.63 When an entity challenges its designation as an
FTO, the repercussions of designation satisfy the first and second
element of constitutional standing,64 and the legislation’s removal
provision satisfies the third element.65
However, because Section 1189 only applies to foreign terrorist
organizations, the entity must demonstrate a fourth element—that it
has “come within the territory of the United States and develop[ed]
substantial connections with this country.”66 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has not clarified how “substantial” connections must
be to merit protection,67 the Court extends constitutional standing to
any alien that voluntarily and “lawfully enters and resides in this
country.”68
B. Qualifying Entities and Procedural Due Process
Once the foreign organization proves constitutional
standing,69 it may challenge its designation on Fifth Amendment due
process grounds.70 The Fifth Amendment does not, however, have
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of
another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).
62 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
63 Lujan v. Defendants of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
64 See supra Part I.C.
65 See supra Part I.D.
66 United States v. Verdugo-Urqueidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
67 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 202
(D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter “PMOI II”].
68 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
69 See supra Part III.A.1.
70 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
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fixed technical requirements; its standards vary depending on
particular situations and circumstances.71
In its most basic form, procedural due process mandates some
notice of the impending deprivation and some form of a hearing.72
When the notice and hearing must occur depends on the private
interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the value of
additional safeguards, and the government interest at stake.73 Also,
the type of notice and hearing depends on (1) if the notice was
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
opportunity to present their objections”;74 and (2) if the hearing was
“appropriate to the nature of the case” and “minimizes substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations.”75 Additionally, where due process
and national security concerns conflict, the U.S. government is
allowed wider latitude to act “because of the changeable and
explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact
that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot
CONST. amend. V. Importantly, the Due Process clause has both procedural and
substantive components. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545-546
(3d ed. 2006) (noting that procedural due process refers to “the procedures that the
government must follow before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property,”
while substantive due process asks “whether the government has an adequate
reason [or a sufficient justification] for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property”).
71 Verdugo-Uriqueidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (explaining that “the question of which
specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be applied in a particular context . . . can
be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular
circumstances of a particular case.”)).
72 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
The Supreme Court originally created the Matthews test to determine the
requirements of due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
However, recently, the Court uses the Mullane test instead of Mathews to examine
the sufficiency of notice. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006);
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 161-162 (2002) (stating, “the
straightforward reasonableness under the circumstances test of Mullane, not the
balancing test approach of Mathews, supplies the appropriate analytical framework
for the due process analysis.”).
73 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
74 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
75 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972).
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be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the
legislature . . . .”76
C. Section 1189 and the Due Process Debate
Section 1189 is facially constitutional because the legislation
requires the Secretary of State to provide designated organizations
some notice of designation and some opportunity for judicial review.77
Critics argue, however, that the legislatively prescribed notice and
hearing provisions are insufficient and inappropriate.78 Specifically, a
foreign organization is unlikely to actually receive notice of the
“pendency of the action,” and Section 1189 only requires
constructive notice—i.e., notice through publication in the Federal
Register.79 Moreover, the post-deprivation hearing fails to provide
putative organizations with a “meaningful opportunity to be heard”
because the U.S. government is not required to disclose all evidence
contained in the administrative record.80 Critics also question the
sincerity of the judiciary’s review, citing the court’s weariness to
second-guess the Executive branch in matters of foreign policy and
national security.81
This comment rebuts these assertions and demonstrates how
the FTO designation procedures comport with public policy and
practical due process considerations. In this manner, Section 1189
represents an effective balancing of national security interests and
core foundational liberties.

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
8 U.S.C. § 1189.
78 A Double Due Process Denial, supra note 9, at 167-172.
79 Id.
80 Id. (noting that the Secretary may rely on confidential evidence that
does not have to be disclosed to putative organizations in the administrative
record).
81 See, e.g., PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208-209; People’s Mojahedin Org. of
Iran v. State Dep’t, 613 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Circ. 2010) [hereinafter “PMOI V”]; In
re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter
“PMOI VI”].
76
77
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III. SECTION 1189, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, AND THE CASE OF
THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN
One organization—the People’s Mojahedin Organization of
Iran (PMOI)—has challenged its FTO designation on six different
occasions, most recently in May 2012. The PMOI cases provide
insight into how courts review a designated organization’s challenge,
and how Section 1189 satisfies contemporary procedural due process
requirements.
A. A Short History of the PMOI
The PMOI (also known as the Mujahedeen-e- Khalq (MEK))
is a Marxist-Islamic organization that was founded in 1963 in order to
overthrow the Shah of Iran and his Western-backed allies.82 At its
inception, the PMOI possessed a militant wing (the National
Liberation Army (NLA)) and a political front (the National Council
of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)).83
In the 1970s, the PMOI began an active, worldwide campaign
of propaganda and terror, claiming responsibility for bombing the
U.S. Information Service office in Iran (part of the U.S. Embassy),
the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S.
companies.84 According to the U.S. government, the PMOI also
played an important role in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran.85
In 1981, displeased with the new Islamic regime implemented
after the Shah’s fall, the PMOI began to attack Iranian security
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY
REPORTS
ON
TERRORISM,
(2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553. htm - MEK [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS] (noting that the founders were six leftist students from
Tehran University).
83 Id.
84 Id. (noting that the PMOI was also held answerable for the
assassination of U.S. military personnel and civilians working in the region, notably
the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran, members of the U.S.
Military Assistance Advisory Group, and an American Texaco executive).
85 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
82
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forces.86 The Iranian government responded harshly, executing the
organization’s original leadership and forcing the remaining known
members to flee to France.87
In 1986, France expelled the PMOI in an attempt to improve
relations with Iran.88 The organization relocated to Iraq, where it
found an ally in Saddam Hussein.89 Hussein provided the PMOI with
military bases and financial support.90 In return, the PMOI supported
Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War and the bloody crackdown on Iraqi
Shia and Kurds that rose up against Hussein’s regime.91
With Hussein’s blessing, the PMOI continued its campaign of
terror against the Iranian regime. In 1992, the PMOI attacked Iranian
embassies and consular missions in thirteen different countries;
including the Iranian mission at the United Nations in New York.92
In 1997, in response to the PMOI’s history of terror and violence,
the U.S. State Department designated the organization as an FTO in
the first FTO List.93
In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam
Hussein’s regime. Without Hussein, the PMOI lost its financial and
military support.94 In short order, the PMOI negotiated a cease-fire
and surrendered its heavy arms to coalition forces.95
As of 2011, the U.S. State Department estimates global
PMOI membership of between 5,000 and 13,500 persons scattered
throughout Europe, North America, and Iraq.96 The State
86 Id. (noting that “the [PMOI] instigated a bombing campaign, including
an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime
Minister’s office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials”).
87 Id.
88 ALBERT V. BENLIOT, IRAN: OUTLAW, OUTCAST OR NORMAL
COUNTRY? 101 (2001).
89 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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Department also officially recognizes that most of the PMOI’s
current efforts are political in nature—citing the entity’s “welldeveloped media communications strategy” and “active lobbying and
propaganda efforts.”97
B. The First Challenge: PMOI I
In 1997, the PMOI filed the first request for judicial review of
its designation as an FTO.98 In the complaint, the PMOI urged the
D.C. Circuit to assess the administrative record and decide whether
sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that the PMOI engaged in
“terrorist activities that threatened the national security of the United
States.”99
After reviewing the PMOI’s complaint,100 the court held the
administrative record contained sufficient evidence the PMOI was a
foreign organization that “engaged in bombing[s] and killing[s] in
order to further their political agenda.”101 Moreover, the court did not
find the presence of any actionable rights violation because the
PMOI lacked constitutional standing,102 and because the unique
procedures provided by AEDPA did not require an adversarial
hearing, general agency presentation of evidence, or advanced notice
provided to the entity.103

COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 78.
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19
(D.C. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter “PMOI I”] (noting that, the PMOI’s designation was
considered alongside the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam because “the separate
petitions involved the same statute and similar claims”).
99 Id.; see also supra Part II.D.
100 The court noted that AEDPA limits the scope of its review to
evaluating whether the designation was arbitrary or capricious, contrary to a
constitutional right, in excess of authority, lacked support in the administrative
record, or violated procedures. See PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 22; see also 8 U.S.C. §
1189(b)(3); supra Part III.B.1.
101 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25.
102 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 22 (noting that similar to a foreign nation
opposing “an embargo on it for the purpose of coercing a change in policy” the
PMOI may not claim a constitutional right to due process).
103 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25.
97
98
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C. Satisfaction of Constitutional Standing: PMOI II
In 2001, two years104 after the court decided PMOI I, the
PMOI again requested that the D.C. Circuit review its FTO
designation.105 This time, the court determined that the PMOI passed
constitutional muster106 because its “alter-ego,” the NCRI, owned a
U.S. bank account and had “an overt presence within the National
Press Building in Washington D.C.”107
Having demonstrated constitutional standing, the court found
the PMOI had an actionable due process claim because FTO
designation stigmatized the PMOI,108 limited the mobility of PMOI
members already in the U.S.,109 and restricted PMOI access to its U.S.
bank accounts.110 The Fifth Amendment therefore required the
Secretary of State to provide the PMOI pre-designation notice, access
to any “unclassified items upon which [the Secretary] proposes to
rely,”111 and an opportunity “to present, at least in written form, such
evidence . . . to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate
the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations.”112

See supra Part II.D.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 195-196.
106 Id. (refusing to assess how “substantial” a connection there must be in
order to merit protection, but stating that the PMOI satisfies this requirement.).
107 Id. at 201 (reaching this conclusion despite the PMOI and NCRI’s
insistence that the two are separate entities).
108 Id. at 204, (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436
(1971) (finding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation
of one’s liberty)).
109 PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 204 (finding that if such individuals left the
country, they would be denied readmission).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 206 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-335 (holding that prior to
a deprivation, due process requires the government to weigh: the private interest
affected by the official action; the risk of “erroneous deprivation of such
interest . . . and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and “the government’s interest, including the function and fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail”)).
112 Id.
104
105
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Consequently, the court concluded that the PMOI’s due
process rights were violated because the government failed to
provide the PMOI with (1) an opportunity to file evidence that
rebutted the non-classified evidence, and (2) a meaningful
opportunity to be heard by the Secretary upon the relevant
findings.113 The court, however, refused to vacate the PMOI’s
designation due to U.S. foreign policy and national security
concerns.114 The court instead remanded the complaint and
instructed the Secretary to follow the procedures outlined herein.115
The Secretary complied with the order, and in 2001 re-designated the
PMOI as an FTO.116
D. The Use of Classified Information: PMOI III
On January 17, 2003, the D.C. Circuit again entertained the
PMOI’s request for judicial review.117 This time, the PMOI argued
the Secretary of State’s reliance on “secret evidence”—i.e., “the
classified information that the respondents refused to disclose and
against which PMOI could therefore not effectively defend”—
violated its due process rights.118 In support of its position, the PMOI
cited D.C. Circuit precedent that held “a court may not dispose of
the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.”119
The court acknowledged the persuasiveness of the PMOI’s
argument, but denied the PMOI’s appeal because holding otherwise
would violate constitutional separation of powers.120 The court
Id.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
115 Id.
116 See Re-designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg.
51,088 (Oct. 5, 2001) (re-designating PMOI and its aliases as FTOs).
117 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter “PMOI III”].
118 Id. at 1242.
119 Id. (discussing Abourzek v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-1061 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that “judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the
appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States courts”
and it is therefore a “firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the
merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions” except “in the
most extraordinary circumstances”)).
120 Id. at 1243.
113
114
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explained that “the Executive Branch has control and responsibility
over access to classified information and [a] compelling interest in
withholding national security information from unauthorized persons
in the course of executive business.”121 The court also emphasized
that courts are “often ill-suited to determine the sensitivity of
classified information.”122
E. We’re Different Entities: PMOI IV
On April 2, 2004, the PMOI, through the NRCI, again
requested judicial review of its designation.123 This petition contended
the PMOI and NRCI were separate entities, which made
simultaneous designation improper.124 The court disagreed, citing
substantial evidence on the record that the NCRI was “dominated
and controlled by” the PMOI.125
F. A Winning Argument: PMOI V
On July 15, 2008, the PMOI again requested the Secretary of
State review its FTO designation, citing a fundamental change in
circumstances.126 The request emphasized that since its designation as
an FTO in 1997, the PMOI had: (1) ended its military campaign
against the Iranian Regime; (2) renounced violence; (3) handed over
arms to U.S. forces in Iraq; (4) cooperated with U.S. officials at Camp
Ashraf and obtained “protected person” status for all PMOI
PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1242.
Id. (explaining that the role of the court is to determine “that process
which is due under the circumstances of the case”) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (explaining that “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”)); see also United States
v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that “[t]hings that did not
make sense to [a judge] would make all too much sense to a foreign counter
intelligence specialist . . . “).
123 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152
(D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter “PMOI IV”].
124 Id. at 157.
125 Id. at 159.
126 See In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of the Mujahedinel Kalq Organization (MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, 74 Fed. Reg. 1273, 1273-74 (Jan. 12, 2009) (hereinafter Review of
Designation).
121
122
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members under the Fourth Geneva Convention; (5) shared
intelligence with the U.S. government regarding Iran’s nuclear
program; and (6) been de-listed as a terrorist organization by the
United Kingdom and European Union.127
On January 12, 2009, the Secretary dismissed the PMOI’s
appeal without explanation, and re-listed the PMOI as an FTO the
following day.128 The PMOI then filed an appeal in the D.C.
Circuit.129
Citing the PMOI’s petition to the Secretary and the alleged
change of circumstances, the court held that the U.S. government
violated the PMOI’s due process rights130 because the Secretary’s
notice failed to (1) specify the unclassified material “on which the
Secretary proposes to rely” and (2) allow the PMOI an opportunity
for rebuttal prior to re-designation.131 The court again hesitated to
vacate the PMOI’s designation because of the realities of U.S. foreign
policy and national security.132 The court, therefore, remanded the
decision and allowed the Secretary 180 days to amend the
administrative record and provide the PMOI with an opportunity to
respond.133
G. The Government’s Failure to Respond: PMOI VI
The Secretary of State failed to comply with the court’s
order.134 Consequently, two years later, on May 8, 2012, the PMOI

127
128

PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 225.
PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 220; see also Review of Designation, supra note

124.
PMOI V, 613 F.3d at 226.
Id. at 228; see also supra note 123 (listing the alleged changed
circumstances).
131 Id. at 227-228.
132 Id. at 229.
133 Id. at 232 (Henderson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Secretary
needs not disclose any confidential information and the Secretary appears to
recognize the ambiguity of the record by “recommending a sua sponte
reexamination of the PMOI’s status in two years”).
134 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 834 (citing PMOI III, 613 F.3d at 225).
129
130
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petitioned the court to issue a writ of mandamus135 that ordered “the
delisting of the PMOI or, alternatively, required the Secretary to
make a decision on the PMOI’s petition.”136
In support of its petition the PMOI offered the following
evidence. In September 2010, two months after the court remanded
the case, the U.S. government provided the PMOI all unclassified
material contained in the administrative record and indicated that the
State Department would follow up with additional materially relevant
information.137 In October, the Department of Justice notified the
PMOI that the State Department was still updating the record but
had nothing more to add at that time.138 The Department of Justice
also requested that the PMOI respond to the September 2010
material by December 29, 2010, which the PMOI did.139 In April
2011, counsel for the PMOI met with officials from the Department
of Justice and the State Department and submitted further
information in support of its cause.140 In May 2011, the government
added ten documents to the record, and the PMOI responded to
each.141 On August 4, 2011, the Department of Justice informed the
PMOI that the declassifying process was complete and that the State
Department was working “as quickly as possible on their review of
the designation.”142 On September 27, 2011, two more documents
were added to the record, which the PMOI cited as duplicative.143
After this request, the Department of Justice did not ask the PMOI

A writ of mandamus requires that the requesting entity prove that the
Secretary had a duty to act and unreasonably delayed in acting. PMOI V, 613 F.3d
at 226.
136 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 834 (citing PMOI III, 613 F.3d at 225).
137 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 835.
138 Id. at 836.
139 Id.
140 Id. (describing that the “allegedly deteriorating conditions at Camp
Ashraf and letters and affidavits in support [of its petition were] written by
American and Foreign leaders”).
141 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 836.
142 Id.
143 Id.
135
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for any additional information, nor did the Secretary take any final
action on the PMOI’s petition.144
The court found these facts demonstrated that the Secretary
egregiously delayed in responding to the PMOI’s petition.145 Noting
the breach of a Congressional timetable “does not, alone, justify
judicial intervention,”146 the court held the Secretary’s twenty-month
failure to act “plainly frustrates the congressional intent and cuts
strongly in favor of granting PMOI’s mandamus petition.”147
The government responded by arguing that the “demands
placed upon the Secretary” should allow for greater flexibility.148 The
court found this unpersuasive, explaining, “Congress undoubtedly
knew of these demand[s]” and chose to limit the Secretary’s response
time to 180 days.149 Moreover, if the court upheld the Secretary’s
actions, it would effectively nullify the court order and insulate the
agency from review “by making it impossible for the petitioners to
‘mount a challenge to the rules.’ ”150
Despite strongly condemning the government’s actions the
court denied the writ and remanded the decision to the State
Department, citing U.S. foreign policy and national security
concerns.151 The court’s order warned the Secretary that any failure to
comply with this 180-day deadline would result in the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that sets aside the PMOI’s designation.152

PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 837.
Id.
146 Id. (citing In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
147 Id. at 837.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 838 (citing In re Core Communications, Inc.,
455 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (invalidating the Federal Communications
Commission’s inter-carrier compensation rules after finding six years passed
without the agency adhering to a court order)). In this case the court noted that the
Secretary’s inability to provide a decision within the last 600 days exemplifies the
nullification of the court’s decision and deprivation of an organization’s right to
judicial review under AEDPA. PMOI IV, 190 F.3d at 837.
151 PMOI VI, 680 F.3d at 836.
152 Id.
144
145
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H. De-Listing the PMOI
On September 28, 2012, three days before the court’s
deadline, the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson,
issued a media note stating that, effective immediately, the PMOI was
delisted as an FTO under Executive Order 13224.153 Pursuant to this
order, the organization’s property was no longer blocked, and U.S.
entities could “engage in transactions with the [PMOI] without
obtaining a license.”154
The Secretary explained the decision by citing the PMOI’s
“public renunciation of violence, absence of confirmed acts of
terrorism for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the
peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base,”155
as evidence of changed circumstances.156 The release also noted that
the State Department continued to have “serious concerns about the
[PMOI] as an organization,” and the Secretary of State’s decision did
not overlook the PMOI’s past—specifically, the organization’s
“involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and
an attack on U.S. soil in 1992.”157
IV. SECTION 1189 AND DUE PROCESS IN LIGHT OF THE PMOI CASES
There are three primary considerations when reviewing the
constitutionality of Section 1189 in light of due process requirements.
First, due process is not a fixed technical concept—requirements vary
depending on particular situations and circumstances.158 Second,
where an organization demonstrates constitutional standing, the
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Secretary, Delisting of
the
Mujahedin-e
Khalq
(Sept.
28,
2012)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm.
154 Id.
155 Id. Regarding Camp Ashraf, the press release also specifically noted
that the U.S. “has consistently maintained a humanitarian interest in seeking the
safe, secure, and humane resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf, as well as in
supporting the United Nations-led efforts to relocate eligible former Ashraf
residents outside of Iraq.” Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. For a review of the holdings discussed, see infra Appendix.
158 See supra Part III.B.
153
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entity automatically possesses an actionable due process claim
because of the stigma that attaches to designation constitutes a legally
cognizable injury.159 Third, where due process rights and national
security interests overlap, courts permit the U.S. government wider
latitude in its actions.160 With these considerations in mind, the
remainder of this comment analyzes the PMOI cases in light of the
Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process clause.
A. Due Process and Section 1189: The Notice Requirement
Procedural due process requires that affected parties be given
notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.”161 In other words, the notice
must inform the recipient what is being proposed, and what must be
done to prevent the deprivation of rights.162 Post-deprivation notice
is only permissible where pre-deprivation notice is impractical or
impossible, and post-deprivation remedies exist.163
In the initial designation of an FTO, the U.S. government
provides notice of designation when the entity is “listed” in the
Federal Register.164 This post-deprivation notice informs the putative
organization of its designation and cites to Section 1189, which
outlines the proper methods of appeal.165 Requiring pre-deprivation
notice would plainly frustrate the purpose of Section 1189 because it
would inform putative organizations that the U.S. is investigating its
clandestine activities. The organization would then (1) tighten up its
network—which negatively impacts the ability of the U.S. to gather

See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 204, (citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436
(holding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation of
ones liberty)).
160 See id.
161 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
162 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
163 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (quoting Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981).
164 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
165 See, e.g., Review of Designation, supra note 124.
159
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information on the organization—and (2) withdraw all funds from
U.S. controlled banks.166
Alternatively, when re-designating an FTO, the Fifth
Amendment’s burdens adjust. Here, the U.S. government must
provide putative organizations with pre-deprivation notice and access
to all unclassified material on the record.167 Post-deprivation hearings
are not permissible because national security and public policy
concerns are diminished; the organization has already been notified
of its designation, and its assets are already frozen.
By applying a heightened standard for re-designated
organizations satisfying constitutional muster, the FTO designation
process properly conforms to the “what” and “when” notice
requirements of procedural due process.168 In fact, the Act’s
adaptability to particular situations and circumstances underscores
why due process is an adaptable concept.169
B. Due Process and Section 1189: The Hearing Requirement
The essence of the hearing requirement is to ensure that
designated entities are given a meaningful opportunity to “be heard in
[its] defense.”170 In order to satisfy this requirement, the hearing must
be commensurate with the interest affected, taking into account the
State’s administrative needs.171
In PMOI II, the court properly used the test developed by the
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge172 to determine whether due
166

See supra Part I.C. (discussing the purpose and consequences of

designation).
See id. (discussing PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 205).
See supra Part IV.B.
169 Verdugo-Uriqueidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (explaining that “the question of which
specific safeguards . . . are appropriate to be applied in a particular context . . . can
be reduced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular
circumstances of a particular case.”)).
170 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
171 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 349.
172 While Mullane’s reasonableness standard could address all of these
concerns, the court in PMOI II applied the Matthews test. PMOI II, 251 F.3d at
167
168
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process is satisfied when a putative organization is given a postdeprivation hearing “in written form.”173 The Matthews test balances
(1) the private interest affected by the government’s action, (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest by the procedures
employed by the government as well as the probable value of any
additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interests,
including the administrative burden of any additional procedural
requirements.174 The weighing of these interests indicates that
procedural due process does not require the government to give
putative organization more than a post-deprivation hearing in written
form.
1. The private interest
Putative organizations always have at least two significant
liberty interests at stake.175 The organization has an interest in the
stigma that attaches to designation,176 and in the right of members to
travel or make contributions to its cause.177 However, in addition to
assessing the private interest at stake,178 Matthews also instructs courts
to consider (1) “the possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . .
benefits”,179 and (2) “the degree of potential deprivation that may be
created by a particular decision.”180

208; see also supra note 69. Further, the Matthews test is arguably better suited to
determine the specific factors that should be examined in conducting this particular
type of due process analysis. PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208; see also Broxmeyer, supra
note 9, at 464-65.
173 PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
174 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
175 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 113; Boddie, 401 U.S. at
380-81; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160-61.
176 See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 204, (citing Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436
(holding that stigmatization in a community without process is a deprivation of
one’s liberty)).
177 See PMOI II, 251 F. 3d at 208.
178 See supra Part IV.C; cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 113, 113-14 (holding
that a “driver’s license may not be so vital and essential” as to be considered
“significant”).
179 Id. (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
180 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 341.
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An FTO’s deprivation lasts a minimum of two years and a
maximum of five.181 The degree of deprivation also varies from case
to case, depending on the putative organization’s presence and
membership in the U.S. Consequently, while the liberty interests at
stake might first appear to favor providing more than a postdeprivation hearing “in written form,” further exploration
demonstrates that this factor fails to provide a stable guide for the
type of hearing required or when the hearing should take place.
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation
“Procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of
cases.”182 In this manner, the “risk of erroneous deprivation” factor
focuses on the “fairness and reliability” of the procedure.183
Critics may point to PMOI VI as evidence that the FTO
designation process carries a high risk of erroneous deprivation. That
argument, however, ignores the PMOI’s long history of violence and
terror. During the 1970’s the PMOI bombed U.S. targets in Iran and
assisted in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.184 Further,
when the PMOI was first designated as an FTO in 1997, the
organization was only five years removed from a terrorist attack on
U.S. soil.185 Finally, the PMOI supported Saddam Hussein in bloody
crackdowns on Iraqi Shia and Kurds, and only reformed after
Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003.186
Meanwhile, the U.S. government expends a great deal of
resources and effort to ensure that C/ST, with the support of the
intelligence community and the Department of State, properly
identifies organizations that are foreign, engage in terrorist activities,
and threaten American national security.187 Section 1189 also employs
181 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C) (explaining that the State Department
must review designations every five years).
182 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 344.
183 Id.
184 See supra Part IV.A.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).
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procedural safeguards that permit the review of a designated
organization’s status every two years, and require review every five.188
Erroneous deprivations are atypical and highly unlikely because the
designation of an entity as an FTO follows carefully prescribed
procedures and is neither random nor arbitrary.
3. The government interest
The last Matthews factor assesses the government’s interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burden of any additional
procedural requirements.189
Trial type hearings are a massive expenditure both in terms of
time and resources. A Congressional Service Report on the FTO List
suggests that, “[i]t is a significant bureaucratic burden to ensure that
the designations are appropriately reviewed, investigated, the
administrative records updated, the appropriate agencies consulted,
and the public statement of renewal made every two years after the
initial designation.”190 Moreover, the number of designated
organizations has almost doubled since 1997, and continues to
grow.191
The nature of foreign affairs and the purpose of this
legislation also favor construing due process requirements in a
manner that grants deference to the “changeable and explosive
nature of contemporary international relations.”192 In other words,
the executive branch should be given a “brush broader than that it
customarily wields in domestic areas.”193 This ensures that the U.S.
government is not bogged down in administrative procedures when it
must react quickly to developments abroad.

8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C).
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 344.
190 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE
“FTO LIST” AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2003).
191 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
192 See supra Part II.B (citing Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17, 85).
193 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17, 85).
188
189
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4. What kind of hearing is appropriate and when should it occur?
In light of the small risk of erroneous deprivation and the
onerous burden of oral hearings (and because private interests may
vary substantially), the court in PMOI II was correct to suggest that
FTO designations satisfy the requirements of procedural due process
when putative organizations are given a post-deprivation hearing “in
written form.”194
The U.S. government has a considerable interest in fighting
terrorism.195 Similar to requiring pre-deprivation notice,196 requiring a
pre-deprivation hearing would allow an organization to withdraw its
funds and supporters from the U.S. This would frustrate the purpose
and effectiveness of the legislation.197 Moreover, the procedures
described herein provide designated organizations with the
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”198
C. Does the Use of Undisclosed Classified Information Raise Any
Due Process Concerns?
Closely related to the hearing requirement is the right of a
party to be confronted with the evidence against it. Critics argue that
the government’s reliance on ex parte and in camera submissions
impermissibly deprives organizations of due process.199 While there is
certainly some precedent and credence to this argument,200 the
importance of national security overrides any limited benefits of
disclosure.
PMOI II, 251 F.3d at 208.
See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (stating that deterring terrorism is
the purpose of the law); see also supra note 2.
196 See supra Part IV.A.
197 AEDPA at § 301(b).
198 Id. at 1242.
199 Reagan, 785 F.2d at 1061.
200 See PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1243 (emphasizing that “judicial
proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in
the adjudications of United States courts” and it is therefore a “firmly held main
rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in
camera submissions” except “in the most extraordinary circumstances”).
194
195
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In PMOI III, the court emphasized the importance of
allowing the Executive to control access to classified information,
and that courts are “ill-suited to determine the sensitivity of classified
information.”201 Perhaps more persuasive is the fact that the
organizations requesting access to classified materials are the very
organizations the U.S. government believes to be engaging in
operations adverse to U.S. interests. Requiring the disclosure of
classified information is akin to asking the U.S. to hand over its
secrets to the “enemy.” Not only would such a requirement frustrate
the purposes of the law, but it would also jeopardize national
security. Because of these considerations, the Supreme Court
properly recognizes that “confidentiality is essential to the effective
operation of our foreign intelligence services,”202 and the government
must be able to “tender as absolute an assurance of confidentiality as
it can.”203
While it is easy to consider the unfortunate organization that
is wrongfully designated, every organization listed as an FTO has
raised a legitimate flag in the eyes of the U.S. government. A
wrongfully designated organization should be able to demonstrate its
innocence without access to classified information, as exemplified by
the PMOI.204
CONCLUSION
Foreign terrorist organizations pose a real and constantly
evolving threat to U.S. national security. The AEDPA tempers that
threat by allowing the U.S. government to bring “legal clarity to
efforts to identify and prosecute members of terrorist organizations
and those who support them.”205 At the same time, the U.S. must not
lose sight of foundational principles upon which it was established.
As Justice Hand noted, “[j]ustice is the tolerable accommodation of
201 PMOI III, 327 F.3d at 1242; see also Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623 (explaining
that “[t]hings that did not make sense to [a judge] would make all too much sense
to a foreign counter intelligence specialist. . . .”).
202 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
203 CIA v. Simms, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
204 See supra Part IV.F.
205 CRS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
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the conflicting interests of society.”206 The government must walk a
fine line between protecting the rights of its citizens and protecting
their safety.
While there may have been initial due process concerns raised
by the enactment of Section 1189, the PMOI cases illustrate how the
FTO designation processes effectively balance the government’s twin
interests. If the government missteps, PMOI VI demonstrates that
the judiciary is willing to involve itself, remedy the deprivation, and
reset the precarious balance between freedom and security.

Philip Hamburger, The Great Judge, LIFE, Nov. 4, 1946, at 117
(quoting Judge Hand).
206
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Appendix: A Synthesis of the PMOI Decisions
Case

Year

Issue

Holding

PMOI I

1999

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held that FTO
designation procedures did not
require adversarial hearings or
advance notice because the
PMOI lacked constitutional
standing and the administrative
record contained sufficient
evidence.

PMOI II

2001

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court found (1) the
PMOI satisfied constitutional
standing, (2) the U.S.
government deprived the PMOI
of liberty and property, and (3)
the U.S. government did not
provide the PMOI with adequate
process. However, foreign policy
and national security concerns
required the court to remand the
complaint and afford the
Secretary of State an opportunity
to remedy these violations.

PMOI III

2003

Whether the
Secretary of State’s
reliance on classified
information violates
procedural due
process.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held the Act
only required disclosure of
unclassified information because
the executive branch has a
compelling interest in controlling
access to classified information
and courts are ill-equipped to
make such decisions.
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Appendix: A Synthesis of the PMOI Decisions (cont’d)
Case

Year

Issue

Holding

PMOI IV

2004

Whether the PMOI
and the NCRI are
separate entities,
making simultaneous
designation improper.

In denying the petition for
review, the court held that
substantial evidence on the
record demonstrated the NCRI
is controlled by the PMOI.

PMOI V

2009

Whether there is
sufficient evidence
demonstrating the
PMOI conducts
terrorist activities and
threatens the security
of the U.S.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court held the
Secretary of State violated the
PMOI’s procedural due process
rights by failing to consider the
PMOI’s allegations of a change
in circumstances prior to redesignation. However, foreign
policy and national security
concerns required the court to
remand the petition and afford
the Secretary of State an
opportunity to remedy these
violations.

PMOI VI

2012

Whether a writ of
mandamus
is
an
appropriate remedy.

In remanding the petition for
review, the court condemned the
Secretary for failing to respond
to
the
PMOI’s
petition.
However, the court again
deferred to foreign policy and
national security considerations
and demanded the Secretary
respond to the petition within
180 days or the writ would be
granted.

Delisting
the
PMOI

2012

On September 28, 2012 the U.S. State Department
delisted the PMOI as a FTO.
.
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